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ABSTRACT 
NIETZSCHE’S: AUTONOMY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND WILL UNIFICATION 
by 
Waylon Smith 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor William Bristow 
 
The modern analytic’s conception of morality usually grounds the agent’s moral-
ity in some conception of responsibility and autonomy. Friedrich Nietzsche agrees that 
morality should be grounded in responsibility and autonomy, however his conceptions 
of responsibility and autonomy are quite different from the modern analytic literature. 
In this paper, I present Nietzsche’s account of autonomy and responsibility.  In part one, 
I describe Nietzsche’s beliefs about human nature and how the human psyche became 
disparate. The sovereign individual is also introduced as the Nietzschean ideal capable 
of autonomy and responsibility.  The second part of the paper refines Nietzshce’s ideas 
concerning both the will and free will and their relation to morality. Finally, I argue that 
Nietzsche provides a process of how a disparate individual may become an autonomous 
and responsible individual. 
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Introduction 
          We use the word “I” in everyday language, and it is this word “I’ that conceptually 
unifies our actions. For example, “I have a desire for ice cream.  I am thinking about sum-
mer.  I appreciate hot weather and I love Mary.” Every thought in my head, whether  it be 
a value, a desire, etc. is attached to this “I.”  And it is this “I” that unifies all the various 
mental states.  It is also the “I” that unifies all my various actions. For example, “I bought 
ice cream and I ate it.” In this way, my deep thoughts, my grief, my joy, and my actions 
involved in both the purchasing and eating of ice cream are all round this “I.” Thus, I 
believe that when I say “I,” I take responsibility for my actions.            
             We can think of responsibility in two ways, in a non-moral sense and in a moral 
sense.  First, in a non-moral sense, we can claim that one event is the cause of another or 
one event is the reason for another, thus one event is responsible for another event.  For 
example, when asked, “Why does the sun rise and set?” I might respond by saying that 
the Earth’s rotation around the sun is the reason or the cause for the Sun’s rising and 
setting. Second, in a moral sense, a person is held morally responsible or morally account-
able for an unjust action if that person is both the cause of that unjust action, and that 
person had the freedom to do otherwise. What makes me both the cause of my action and 
gives me the freedom to do otherwise is usually grounded in some type of conscious effort 
of control that I have exhibited while committing the action. Thus, if I am conscious of 
my actions, then I am both autonomous and responsible for my actions.    
              However, Nietzsche does not believe this exact relationship between conscious-
ness and responsibility exists. The consciousness of my action, and even this feeling of 
deliberateness that “I am the cause” of my actions is not enough for Nietzsche to ascribe 
autonomy and responsibility to an agent.  Instead, Nietzsche argues that responsibility 
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and freedom are grounded in a unified will, and that will is unified by a particular set of 
dominating instincts.  
  Nietzsche articulates much of this view about responsibility and autonomy within 
the The Genealogy of Morals Essay 2, but because there are multiple stories, it is easy to 
lose the focus of Nietzsche’s main theme within this essay.  For example, one story ex-
plains how the active capacity of forgetting is overcome by suffering, thus producing both 
memory and the idea of promising.  A second story explains how guilt and punishment 
arose out of a man made sickness called the “the bad conscience.” However, there is also 
a more general story which encapsulates both these two stories and Nietzsche’s work as a 
whole.  It is the story of how the human psyche became various and disparate and how 
those various wills which constitute this psyche need to be unified in order for the human 
to become a responsible, “sovereign individual.” Taking this more general story into ac-
count, the story of promising may be interpreted as a story of a will in the present moment 
trying to both sustain itself and take responsibility for some future moment.  And, the 
story of guilt becomes a story of a will in the present moment reaching back into some 
past moment, trying to claim that it is the same will responsible for a past action during 
that past moment.   
These stories give credit to Nietzsche’s belief that the process of unifying the will is 
one of man’s1 most important endeavors. However, what Nietzsche means by “will unifi-
cation” and “the process of will unification” are debated topics. In this paper, I argue that 
will unification is the ranking and ordering of an individual’s values, and I argue that will 
                                                          
1For ease of interpreting Nietzsche, “he” and “man” is used throughout this paper.  However, Nietzsche’s 
psychology applies to both men and women.   
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unification is a three part process in which an individual proceeds through a linear pro-
gression of spirits known as the camel, the lion, and the child. My argument involves 
equating Nietzsche’s ideal of the “child” from the first speech of Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
with his ideal of the “sovereign individual” in On the Genealogy of Morals, and I will ar-
gue for my thesis in the following manner. First, I present what Nietzsche believes to be 
both the history and the metaphysics of the human psyche. This involves a psychological 
account of how the human will became disparate, and Nietzsche’s definition of a free-
willed sovereign individual. The second part of the paper refines Nietzsche’s conception 
of will, morality, and the self-constituted individual using: (a) Paul Katsafanas’s interpre-
tation of Nietzsche’s psychology (b) relations between the unified will, fragmented will, 
self, body, sense, and spirit.  And (c) Nietzsche’s three progressions of thought within 
morality. The third, and final part of the paper, argues that Nietzsche has given us a struc-
tured process describing how to unify the will and thus become a sovereign, responsible 
individual. That process involves ranking and ordering one’s values which can only hap-
pen once the individual has progressed through three spirits: the camel, the lion, and the 
child which are all presented in the first speech of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
 
PART 1. HUMAN NATURE:  The Development of the Disparate Will 
Nietzsche believes that the components of man’s psyche evolved parallel to the 
process of culture and civilization. “Man found himself within the walls of society and of 
peace,” and this relation between man and society created “the stress of the most funda-
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mental change he ever experienced” (GM 2,16 [p.84]).  This stress was due to the interac-
tion between the individual and the society, and the stress was of a specific sort. Nietzsche 
claims:  
 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly, turn themselves inward—this is what I call inter-
nalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his “soul.” The entire inner 
world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, ac-
quired depth, breadth, and height in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. (GM 2, 16 
[p.84])       
 
From this quote, a certain explanation of Nietzsche’s psychology can be formed.  
At one point in time, man’s instincts “discharged themselves outwardly.”  At this time, 
man was not psychologically complex.  In fact, he may have been as simple as most other 
mammalian type animals. However, this psychological feature (simplicity) changed with 
the growth of man’s social relations. As cultures and societies formed, man’s bodily in-
stincts were blocked, and thus this manifold of instincts could not be expressed in any 
external sense. However, these instincts did not dissipate, go away, or cease to be. Instead, 
they reversed their direction and turned back on man himself in the “same measure” or 
the same amount that they could not be discharged externally. This internal discharge of 
instincts expanded man’s inner, mental world in “depth, breadth, and height.”  The output 
of this process consisted in various psychological drives which were both an extension 
and a mirror of the body’s instinctive drives.   
Nietzsche also alludes to this relationship between the body and the consciousness 
in Zarathustra. He writes, “And how nicely the bitch sensuality knows how to beg for a 
piece of spirit when a piece of flesh is denied her.” (TSZ 1:13 [48])  This quote describes 
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the instinct as being denied its satisfaction in material or external “flesh.” Due to this de-
nial, the instinct turns inward and alleviates its desire by expressing itself spiritually or 
within the mental realm. Notice how this interpretation of the quote matches with the 
previous quote: “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outward turn inward—this 
is what I call the internalization of man.” (GM 2,16 [p.84])   
This process seems complex, but Nietzsche believes it all to be a part of what he 
calls the “will to power.” Though the body is full of various instincts, these instincts are 
instantiations of a more fundamental and basic instinct. That instinct is “the instinct for 
freedom (in my language: the will to power); only here the material upon which the form-
giving and ravishing nature of this force vents itself is man himself” (GM 2,18 [p.87]). 
From this quote, it can be claimed that Nietzsche believes that the instinct to be free, to 
be an autonomous and responsible individual, is equated with the will to power. And it is 
this primal, fundamental instinct that causes the development of all the other instincts.  
For Nietzsche, “life simply is will to power” (BGE, 259 [p.203]). The following quote ex-
presses this idea in full. 
 
“Suppose finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as development and ramification of 
one basic form of the will—namely the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions 
could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of pro-
creation and nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to determine all effi-
cient force univocally as—will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined 
according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to power” and nothing else” (BGE 36  [p.48]). 
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 At first glance, Nietzsche’s “will to power” should be a unifying force in the psyche 
of man. One may think this because the will to power is univocal and informs all the in-
stantiated instincts. However, Nietzsche believes this to be a false assumption. Nietzsche 
writes the “basic drives of man” are “inspiring spirits” and “every single one of them would 
like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the le-
gitimate master of all the other drives.  For every drive wants to be master” (BGE 6 [p.13]). 
From this quote we can claim that the various instincts, which are merely instantiations 
of the will to power, all contain the essence of will to power, and because of this fact, the 
instincts fight among themselves, each believing that it alone is the real expression of life 
affirmation. Due to this conflict among the instincts, Nietzsche petitions the reader to 
view the “(will) as a social structure of the drives and affects,” and as a “mortal” “subjective 
multiplicity” (BGE 12 [p.20]).  
We can now conclude that Nietzsche believes man’s complex and disparate psyche 
is the result of the following process. First, the various instincts in the body are all instan-
tiations of the will to power.  Second, these bodily instincts are usually discharged into 
the environment outside the individual. Third, society imposes restrictions on these ex-
ternal discharges therefore, these instincts reverse their direction and instead discharge 
themselves back upon man’s mental consciousness. Fourth, this interaction between the 
world and the individual creates a complex and various psyche within the individual. This 
psyche is composed of a social structure of wills in which each fragment of will fights for 
supremacy over all others because each disparate will believes that it alone, is will to 
power.   
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1.1 Sovereign Individuals and Fragmented Wills 
The fragmented will and its unification are not explicitly spoken about within the 
Genealogy, but responsibility and the freedom to pursue that responsibility are explicitly 
expressed by means of an ideal called the “sovereign individual.” Nietzsche introduces 
this sovereign individual by first contrasting this ideal with the standard man of society. 
He believes that society and morality subjugate the standard man and make this standard 
man “calculable.” Due to this subjugation, the standard man’s will is a product of sources 
external to himself, and so this standard man is neither free nor responsible according to 
Nietzsche. In contrast, the sovereign individual is “the ripest fruit” of society.  He is au-
tonomous, independent, and has the right to make promises.  He is “liberated from the 
morality of custom” and he is the “master of a free will.” Nietzsche believes that this sov-
ereign individual is the next evolution in man because such a man exists at the end of a 
“tremendous process” which consists in “the society and the morality of custom…reveal-
ing what they have been a means to.” Nietzsche’s sovereign individual has a “proud aware-
ness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare free-
dom,” and “his power over oneself and one’s fate, has in his case penetrated to the pro-
foundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct.”  (GM 2,2) 
At this point, I have presented evidence that Nietzsche believes the fragmented will 
to be a feature of the first evolution of society. I have also presented evidence that Nie-
tzsche believes the sovereign free individual to be the ripest fruit of society and next evo-
lution of man. However, we don’t know exactly what Nietzsche means by “free will” or 
how the sovereign individual assumes these features of free will and responsibility.       
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1.2 Free Will  
The sovereign individual is a “master of free will,” but Nietzsche’s free will is not 
the same free will discussed in modern analytic literature. Nietzsche describes the will 
itself in the following manner. First, he claims, “Willing seems to me to be above all some-
thing complicated, something that is a unit only as a word—and it is precisely in this one 
word that the popular prejudice lurks.” There are “a plurality of sensations” in will.  And 
there is also a ruling thought in every act of will, a commanding thought.  Finally, there is 
an affect, “specifically the affect of command.”  (BGE, 19 [p.25]) From these three asser-
tions, Nietzsche concludes  
 
“That which is termed ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially the affect of superiority in relation to him who must 
obey: ‘I am free, he must obey.’—this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of 
attention, the straight look that fixes itself exclusively on one aim…the inward certainty that obedience will 
be rendered—and whatever else belongs to the position of the commander. A man who wills commands 
something within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience.”  (BGE, 19  [p.26]) 
 
He goes on to say that the will is a “manifold thing,” and each human is “at the 
same time, the commanding and the obeying parties” of oneself.  Nietzsche then follows 
this by equating the soul and will and states, “Our body is but a social structure composed 
of many souls.” Thus Nietzsche believes that man’s will is a complex constitution of many 
different commanding and obeying parties.   
One may argue that this does not mean that Nietzsche believes the will is neces-
sarily fragmented and disparate due to the interactions between man and society. In fact 
he immediately defines free will in the following manner. Free will “is the expression for 
 
 
9 
 
the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the 
same time identifies himself with the executor of the order” (BGE 19 [p.26]).   
Prima facie, this quote may invoke the reader to believe that Nietzsche’s account 
and the modern analytic’s metaphysical question of free will are in agreement. However, 
this is an inaccurate assumption because the modern free will problem understands sci-
ence as a constraint and limiting factor on man’s freedom to control action. Nietzsche 
does not agree with this constraint. He states that there are no “causal connections” and 
that there are no “laws” of nature. Nietzsche instead claims that not just free will, but the 
question of free will in this metaphysical sense is “the best self-contradiction.” In fact, 
even the idea of a free will or an un-free will within a scientifically constrained philosophy 
is nothing but a mythology. Instead, for these reasons, we can conclude that Nietzsche 
disregards scientific constraints and claims that the modern analytic’s question of a met-
aphysically free will is both ridiculous and senseless (BGE, 21 [p.29]).  
It still might not be apparent to the reader why Nietzsche would call the modern 
free will question a contradiction. Permit me to explain. The modern question of free will 
assumes that the world is constrained by the laws of cause and effect. Since men are ob-
jects in the world, men must also be constrained by the laws of cause and effect, and be-
cause of this fact, we must redesign our concepts of free will to be consistent with this 
scientific account. Nietzsche denies this scientifically constrained causal view of the 
world, and so the problem of modern analytic question of free will becomes a senseless 
question.2  
                                                          
2 See Nehamas’s “Life as Literature” for Nietzsche’s account of truth and science. 
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If this is the case, then it is not immediately clear what Nietzsche means when he 
speaks about “free will,” and “responsibility” so we must ask: what does Nietzsche mean 
when he refers to this free sovereign individual? He answers immediately with the state-
ment, “In real life, it is only a matter of strong and weak wills” (BGE 21[p.29]). But, it is 
important to note that Nietzsche is not talking about one man’s will being stronger than 
another man’s will. He is talking about the disparate set of wills within each individual. 
Remember that Nietzsche believes each man, in our modern culture, has become a legion 
of wills, a fundamental multiplicity, “a ball of wild snakes” (TSZ 1:6 [34]), and each frag-
ment of will strives and struggles with the other fragments for power over the whole. Thus, 
when Nietzsche’s speaks of a strong will, he is speaking of one specific fragment of the will 
and its quest to dominate the others. And it seems that any particular fragment might 
become a dominant commander at any time. Thus, “strength” is not an adjective describ-
ing the will as a whole. Strength is a specific feature of one of many disparate wills as that 
specific will assumes dominance over the other disparate wills.  And since any fragment 
may become dominant at any time, the strength of any specific will within this “ball of 
snakes,” is not measured in the frequency that it accesses dominance over the other frag-
ments, but in its ability to both gain power and also hold that power over a certain length 
of time. This is a daunting task when no will wishes to obey, and each of these disparate 
wills wishes to command.  
Returning to Essay 2 in the On The Genealogy Morals, Nietzsche claims that man 
desires to be a creature that can make promises, to connect a present will to a future will. 
This is because the sovereign individual has a sustained dominant instinct that rules over 
the ball of snakes that Nietzsche calls “will” in general. Connecting this understanding of 
the sovereign individual’s dominating instinct with Nietzsche’s premise that there are 
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only strong and weak wills, we can conclude that Nietzsche believes a free will to be a self-
constituting process where the many disparate wills and their separate aims are unified 
by a particular dominating will which remains in its dominant state permanently. This 
permanent dominating will is the will of the “sovereign individual.”  
If my claims to this point are accepted, I have defined what Nietzsche believes to 
be a free will as a will that is ruled permanently by a strong dominating instinct. Using 
this definition of free will we can conclude all of the following. First,  the sovereign indi-
vidual is a person that is both free and responsible for his actions. This autonomy depends 
on the fact that the sovereign individual has some dominating instinct that has become a 
permanent master over all the other fragmented parts of the will. Thus, a fragmented 
whole is unified by a dominating instinct (aka a dominating will) which allows man to 
take responsibility for his actions. And since Nietzsche claims that the sovereign individ-
ual is the only responsible man, the sovereign individual must be an individual who has 
unified his fragmented will because one must have a free will in order to be responsible.  
 
Part 2: Nietzsche’s Will and Its Relations 
In order to understand what unification of a will might mean, it would be helpful 
to know what Nietzsche means when he claims that the will is a “manifold thing” and “a 
necessary social structure.” For that reason the second part of my paper has two goals. 
First, I will argue that each fragment of the will is equated to a particular “drive.” And 
then I will argue that it is these numerous disparate drives and their relations between 
each other that creates both the “manifold” of the will, and its “social structure.” 
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 My second goal further involves a further refinement of Nietzsche’s concept con-
ception of will. In order to achieve this goal I first introduce Paul Katsafanas’ interpreta-
tion of Nietzschean psychology which equates each piece of Nietzsche’s fragmented will 
with what Katsafanas calls a “drive.”  Second, I make further relations between Nie-
tzsche’s conceptions of fragmented will, unified will, body, self, and spirit. And last, I ex-
plain Nietzsche’s denial of the relationship between intentional will, responsibility, and 
morality.  
 
2.1 Drive Psychology 
Paul Katsafanas claims that drives are the fundamental element in Nietzschean 
psychology because they contain both a motivational component and an attitudinal per-
spective component. First, Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche “invokes drives to explain 
broad patterns of behavior rather than particular instances of actions.” (Katsafanas, 7) 
These drives are broad because they have indeterminate aims, and these indeterminate 
aims are different from teleological aims in that drives are not specifically oriented at one 
specific goal. Katsafanas also argues that “drives are indefinitely multiple and deeply in-
tertwined, and the desires, emotions, and other affects that prompt particular actions are 
products of these intertwined drives. Accordingly, actions have highly complex etiologies 
and typically serve a multitude of ends.” (Katsafanas, 13) Thus, it is always a drive or a set 
of drives that are the fundamental explanation to any action. Katsafanas ends this “moti-
vational component” section by providing a brief sample of what he considers to be drives: 
“to imagine metaphors, to nature, to logic, to rest, to fight, to distinguish oneself, to create 
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art, to avoid boredom, to knowledge, to appearances, to religion, to freedom, to domina-
tion, to sex, to property, to politics, to play, to lie, to self-preservations, and to truth.” 
(Katsafanas, 8)  
However, Katsafanas does not stop at the motivation level. He also argues that 
these drives influence and motivate ways in which we perceive the world. Katsafanas sep-
arates the forces of these perspectives into two components. First, drives influence sali-
ence and second, they distort. Due to this salience and distortion, they influence which 
facts we deem relevant and at the same time, they give a perspective “shading” or “color-
ing” to those events and facts.  Because of this coloring and shading, we approach our 
surroundings with a perspective, and it is that perspective which both accesses and filters 
the relative information that we acquire about those surroundings. We can easily make 
sense of such a claim if we think about an example in which ten different people may 
describe a series of events in ten different ways. It is each person’s perspective, that cre-
ates these different interpretive descriptions, and these interpretations are influenced by 
each person’s controlling drive at that moment. Thus, “drives engender selective views of 
the world” (Katsafanas, 10). In this way, Katsafanas’ drives act much like what Nietzsche 
has described as the dominating instinct or the dominating will. And following Nie-
tzsche’s metaphysical story about how a specific disparate will seizes control of the psy-
che, we can make sense of Katsafanas’s drives by equating each particular drive with a 
specific fragment of the disparate will.      
Most importantly for the purposes of my paper, Katsafanas argues that “drives trig-
ger thoughts, patterns of attention, and evaluative outlooks” (Katsafanas, 8). Drives have 
an evaluative component, and our perspectives are shaped by these evaluations. And if 
we follow the argument from the last paragraphs. Each drive is a specific disparate will, 
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and so each disparate will contains specific thoughts (beliefs), patterns of attention (de-
sires), and evaluative outlooks (values).  So, using Katsafanas’s psychology, I claim that 
Nietzsche’s use of the term “will” refers to more than conscious decision or conscious vo-
lition as described by the modern analytic philosopher. For Nietzsche, the will encom-
passes all of our mental activities, and each specific part of the will, each specific snake, 
has a specific set of mental capacities attached to it.  Each fragment of the will has its own 
specific desire, its own specific value, its own specific reasoning capacity, its own perspec-
tive, its own emotions, etc.  Therefore, we can conclude that the human will is a “manifold” 
piece of machinery. 
 
2.2 Relations of Body, Self, Will, Spirit 
Katsafanas’s “drive” psychology explains what it means to be a disparate will, but 
the relations between the disparate will, the unified will, the spirit, the body and the self 
still need to be refined. Nietzsche explains the “spirit” of an individual in the following 
manner. 
 
 What I have just said of a “basic will of spirit” may not be readily understood: permit me an explanation.  
That commanding something which the people call “the spirit” wants to be master in and around its own 
house and wants to feel that it is master; it has the will from multiplicity to simplicity, a will that ties up, 
tames, and is domineering and truly masterful. Its needs and capacities are so far the same as those which 
physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows, and mulitiplies. The spirit’s power to appropriate the 
foreign stands revealed in its inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, and to 
overlook or repulse whatever is totally contradictory…growth in a word—or more precisely, the feeling of 
growth, the feeling of increased power (will to power)  (BGE 230 [p.159]). 
 
 
 
15 
 
Thus, the spirit is a particular dominating instinct (drive) that tries to command 
the other disparate fragments of will. This dominating instinct tries to move the disparate 
“multiplicity” into a “simplistic” unity. It also tries to “appropriate” the other fragments 
of will into itself. However, this assimilation of other disparate wills is also its test of 
power/strength. There is an implicit assumption in the above quote: Not all disparate 
drives (spirits) are capable of this complete appropriation and thus, by Nietzsche’s defi-
nition, these drives (though they may assume power for some time) will never be powerful 
enough to command and unify the whole set of disparate, fragmented wills in a perma-
nent sense. Therefore, there must be a specific drive or drives that has more power than 
others, and it is this specific will that will show its “strength” by appropriating all other 
drives.  This is a first step at understanding what Nietzsche means by “social structure.”  
Each fragment of will is capable of appropriating certain other fragments of will when that 
particular fragment seizes power.  Thus each fragment has a necessary social structure to 
some other fragments of will. 
It is this explanation of spirit that explains the relationship between free will, frag-
mented will, spirit, and the unified will also. First, Nietzsche claims that a “free will” is the 
attribute of will where a specific “strong” fragment of will commands obedience, and rules 
over the other disparate wills. Second, since “strength/power” was defined in the last par-
agraph as that will which appropriates the foreign and “assimilates the old into the new,” 
we can now assume that the fragment of will which is capable of “appropriating” all other 
disparate wills is the strongest will. Third, since the dominating will is called “the spirit” 
we can conclude that the strongest spirit appropriates all the other disparate wills and 
thus, unifies the set of disparate wills into a whole. We can also finally conclude that the 
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dominating spirit must be the spirit of the “sovereign individual” because the sovereign 
individual is ruled by a “permanently” dominant instinct (drive/will fragment).  
Nietzsche also claims that this dominating spirit has a final goal, and that final goal 
is a creation of a “self.” In “On the Despisers of the Body,” Nietzsche writes “senses and 
spirit would like to persuade you that they are the end of all things.”  However, senses and 
spirit are merely “tools and toys,” and “behind them there yet lies the self”  (TSZ 1,4 
[p.30,31]). “Behind… lies the self,” can be interpreted in one of two ways.  The first way 
would claim that Nietzsche is speaking of the self, the senses and the spirit like an onion, 
and if a person peels away the layers of sense and spirit, that person will find the true self  
behind the first layers. This interpretation does not make sense with Nietzsche’s concep-
tion of human nature nor is it consistent with his arguments against a unified “I”. I argue 
this because being a “self” seems to require some type of unification and Nietzsche denies 
this unification when he presents us with a disparate will.  
If these psychological drives are an extension of the body, it does not necessarily 
mean that when the disparate psychology is pulled away, there will be a unified whole 
beneath them.  In fact, it may be better for simplicity to assume the opposite. Nietzsche 
says nothing about the body’s instincts being unified. He only claims that each of the 
body’s instincts correlates with one specific psychological drive. And so, the body’s in-
stincts and the “self” associated with these instincts may parallel the disparateness of the 
extended psychology. 
For these reasons, I propose that “behind” refers to chronology and so, “behind” 
means “after in time.” In this interpretation, “senses and spirit” are necessary capacities 
used to form a unified self. And so, when Nietzsche writes, “Behind your thoughts and 
feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown wise man—his name is 
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Self.  In your body he dwells. He is your body.” Nietzsche is specifically speaking of the 
ability to become a unified Self. The senses and spirit are the means to that end Nietzsche 
calls “self” which can now also be called the unified will or the unified soul.3   
In this same section, Nietzsche also states, “creating body created spirit as a hand 
of its will.” Thus, the will of the body created both sense and spirit as an extension of itself. 
Remembering that sense and spirit are the necessary components for creating a self, a 
crude linear progression of a constituted self can be seen in Nietzsche’s thoughts. Starting 
with bodily instincts, these instincts contain will that is discharged back upon the individ-
ual. The body reacts to this internal discharge by creating and expanding the mental 
world.  This also expands the hand of the body’s will into the mental world. At this point 
there are various disparate fragmented wills (or what we can now call drives) that fight 
for dominance.  Nietzsche believes that most people are dominated at any given time by 
any arbitrary instinct (which we will now call a drive because drives are extensions of 
instincts). However, Nietzsche does not believe this arbitrary, temporarily dominating 
drive succeeds at unifying the whole set of disparate wills. Nor does this this arbitrary, 
temporarily dominating drive make a person responsible. This is because most of these 
drives cannot “appropriate” the whole set of disparate drives. Therefore, Nietzsche be-
lieves there must be a specific drive or drives that are capable of appropriating and thus 
unifying all the other disparate drives, and it is this specific drive or drives that is the 
dominating instinct within the sovereign individual.    
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Notice that this description is also consistent with the way I described Katsafanas’s drive psychology in 
section 2.1 of this paper 
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  2.3 Upshots of Nietzschean Drive Psychology 
There are specific upshots to Nietzsche’s account when we think about responsi-
bility. For instance, when a specific value, desire, and way of reasoning are all linked to-
gether as part of a specific drive, weakness of will is no longer an issue in the way we 
currently understand weakness of will. The modern analytic concern with weakness of 
will disappears because there is no longer a conflict between one’s desires (or emotions/or 
other motivational component) and one’s rationality. If I am eating cake, whether I ap-
prove or disapprove of my actions, I must admit that the single action of eating cake con-
tains a value for a cake, a desire to eat cake, and some type of reasoning to eat the cake. 
Therefore, I must also admit that my dominant will at this moment is one of “cake eating” 
and not the will of “dieting” and that at this moment in time, my desire and value for my  
diet program is weaker than my value to eat cake. This can be extended to moral actions 
in that I am forced to admit that the dominant drive at some time values, desires, and 
believes my actions to be somewhat reasonable even though I may have some moral drive 
that claims these actions are inappropriate. Finally, I am forced to take ownership of all 
my actions and words no matter how cruel or evil I believe them to be, and no matter how 
much I might like to disown them. I cannot merely say, I don’t value that action and thus 
it is not a part of me.   
A second upshot involves the conception of self. When I speak of a sense of self, I 
usually want to speak about a self that is unified and does not alienate any particular ac-
tions or thoughts. However, when values and desires are allowed to be exclusive and break 
apart as they do in some philosophical views, then a person can claim to be unified while 
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also denying certain parts of oneself.4  This is not a problem for Nietzsche’s account be-
cause there is no weakness of will and thus no part of oneself that can be denied. This is 
because there is only the strong will that has a found a dominating place in one’s motiva-
tions and actions. And, until the disparate, fragmented will is unified, there can be no 
genuine conception of self, only multiple fragments of self that take command at given 
times. Because of this fact, I must admit that there are actions that I, as a fragmented self, 
commit that I do not like as opposed to prematurely denying that it was “I”, a fully rational 
intentional self that committed the action.5 
I introduce these upshots, in order to prompt an underlying assumption that 
grounds Nietzsche’s moral psychology (and will also be important in the final part of this 
paper). Many philosophers have used consciousness as a starting point for both self-
knowledge and rationality, and it is the relation between rationality and the other moti-
vating components of the mind that creates both the problem of weakness of will and the 
problem of a unified self in analytic philosophy. Specifically, it is usually the rational con-
scious mind that is associated with the recognition of self-interest and moral duties. How-
ever, emotions or other motivational factors sometimes overrun the rational mind and so, 
people act in ways that are either immoral or not in their best self-interest. It is this phe-
nomenon that is generally recognized as weakness of will. As previously argued, Nie-
tzsche’s psychology cannot recognize this type of weakness of will because, according to 
drive psychology, each drive contains its own conscious rationality, its own emotions, its 
                                                          
4 David Velleman has a narrative paper where he denies his actions in such a way.  
5 This acceptance of one’s actions without there being a self is a tricky conceptual structure which may 
need more explanation.  However, its purpose in this paper is merely to show that Nietzsche doesn’t agree 
with the modern conception of a unified self, and to promote questions about morality.  Thus I will not 
give this conceptual structure a full explanation.  
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own values, and other such motivational factors. Thus rationality is not a separate com-
ponent which conflicts with other motivating factors; instead, rationality is a smaller dis-
tinctive part of a larger whole called a “drive.”   
The same consciousness that is used to assess rationality is used to assess the in-
dividual’s conceptions of both the self and controlled action. Thus, if I am conscious, I am 
capable of being a fully recognized person, and I am (to some degree) in control of my 
actions. This assumption that consciousness, rationality, and conceptions of self are inti-
mately linked to responsibility and control of one’s actions entered the literature with 
Descartes, and it is these intimate connections between the concepts that Nietzsche 
claims we need to overcome. 
Specifically, Nietzsche claims there are three levels of human understanding and 
consciousness existing in the genealogical progression towards morality. In the first level, 
there is the pre-moral in which the consequences of one’s actions being good for oneself 
is most important. At this level, there is no attempt at “self-knowledge” or impartial mo-
rality. Neither is there any attempt to relate morality with conscious intention of any sort. 
There is merely the expression of some instinct to grab that which one desires. This is how 
Plato’s interlocutor Thrasymachus speaks to Socrates in “The Republic.”  Socrates asks, 
“What is justice?” And Thrasymachus replies, “Justice is the interests of the stronger.”  
Crudely, this may also say, “Justice is merely an attempt to limit my desires.”    (Republic, 
338 c) 
Nietzsche goes on to state that there is a second level of understanding. This level 
of understanding involves consciousness; specifically intention. This type of understand-
ing is Kantian, and in a Kantian fashion the answer to the question, “What is moral?” no 
longer concerns “my” personal consequences. Instead, it’s about impartial rationalization 
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by means of a categorical imperative. This intention carries a certain sense of self reflec-
tion, and so “It (also) involves the first attempt at self-knowledge,” because at this level, 
there is a conscious intention to correlate one’s actions with some moral truth.  One must 
become self-reflective and measure if one’s own actions match actions as categorized by 
some objective moral truth.6  
Notice that once this second level of understanding is in place, the individual may 
also reflect back on the former non-self-reflective state in the first level and refer to the 
first level as an egoistic state of morality.  This type of conscious reflection cannot be done 
in the first level of moral understanding, so only the second level can judge the first level 
as egoistic.  
This pattern will continue into the last level, where Nietzsche speaks about that 
which is “ultra-moral” and “unintentional.” And it is at this level that the modern analytic 
problems of weakness of will and conceptions of self disappear. The individual now has a 
new level of understanding that goes “beyond” the intentional.  This understanding allows 
the “ultra-moral” to view and reflect on the second level of consciousness as inferior much 
in the same way that the second level is able to reflect and measure the first level of con-
sciousness as inferior. It is also at this third level that Nietzsche claims we will go past the 
“the skin” of intentional rational thought, approach real self-knowledge, and furtherly de-
velop in a moral sense. Therefore, we can conclude that Nietzsche believes the key to 
man’s next jump in morality is the recognition of that which is unconscious, and it is these 
unconscious factors that hold the key to man’s self-knowledge, freedom, and responsibil-
ity (BGE 32 [p.44]). 
                                                          
6 It is also this level that creates the problems of weakness of will and conceptions of self previously dis-
cussed because it creates rationality (intention) as a motivational component that conflicts with other mo-
tivational factors such as emotion, desire, etc.     
 
 
22 
 
Of course, a claim of this sort can only be understood and used to access self-
knowledge if we accept the exact metaphysics of human nature and human ‘drive’ psy-
chology that Nietzsche has proposed. The proposal follows: All men and women contain 
unconscious drives that correlate with specific values, desires, and actions. There is no 
second order evaluative system that tries to evaluate these drives. There are only weaker 
drives that voice their opinions. Thus, I gain self-knowledge by observing what drives are 
in control during different contexts. I observe my drives by observing my actions and 
thoughts, and it is these actions and thoughts that inform me of who I am.  If I gain this 
knowledge, I am starting a progress from being a weak fragmented self towards a strong 
unified self that has a specific dominant drive at the helm. So for Nietzsche, oddly, the 
first step in taking responsibility for my life does not involve taking responsibility for all 
the actions that I have conscious and intentional control over.  The first step is claiming 
that all my actions are mine in that they are all produced by some specific part of my fr 
 
Part 3: The Spirits:  The Process of Will Unification 
  
If the logic has been followed to this point, then there are two questions left for the 
reader to ask. (1) Does Nietzsche provide a process of how the fragmented will may be-
come unified?  (2) What is this exact process of will unification where one becomes a sov-
ereign individual? Or to ask this question in another way: How might a person acquire 
free will and the ability to be responsible for one’s own actions? Nietzsche’s answers these 
questions in the following manner. He closes the first essay in On the Genealogy of Mor-
als with what he views to be the most important moral aim of man. He states that man 
must make some type of “determination of the order of rank among values.” This is the 
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last sentence before the second essay, and it can therefore be taken as an introduction 
into the question of man’s morality and the question of responsibility that he goes on to 
address in the second essay. He conveys this same claim in Beyond Good and Evil when 
he states, “In the philosopher…his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he 
is—that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to 
each other” (BGE, 6 [p.14]).   
In the previous sections we argued that each value is a component of a specific 
drive, and we argued that a dominating drive is always at the top of the social hierarchy 
within a person’s will, so the last sentence can be reinterpreted as follows: Since a man’s 
morality is decided by the rank and order of his values, a moral, responsible man is a man 
who has ranked and ordered his drives in a correct manner with a dominating instinct 
that properly appropriates all other drives. This means that ranking and ordering ones 
values can also be equated with the process of will unification, and if a person desires to 
take responsibility “there (must be) an order of rank among states of the soul” (BGE, 213 
[p.140]) within that person. Thus, we can conclude that Nietzsche believes that a person 
unifies his will and assumes responsibility for his actions by ranking and ordering his 
values.  If we insert “drives” for values, (which we can because one is a component of the 
other) we can restate the conclusion in the following manner.  Nietzsche believes that if a 
man ranks and orders his drives then that person unifies his will and becomes a respon-
sible moral agent.   
The last part of my paper describes an account of three “spirits” (see 2.2) the indi-
vidual must instantiate before being able to rank and order his values and thus take re-
sponsibility for his actions.  However, the first speech (an aphorism) from Thus Spoke 
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Zarathustra must be read in its entirety before I can give that account. The speech fol-
lows: 
 
Speech 1.  On the Three Transformations 
 
 
Three transformations of the spirit I name for you: how the spirit becomes a camel, 
and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child. 
There is much that is heavy for the spirit, for the strong, weight-bearing spirit in 
which reverence dwells: the heavy and hardest are what its strength desires. 
What is heavy? Thus asks the weight-bearing spirit, and thus it kneels down, like 
the camel, and would be well laden. 
What is heaviest, you heroes? Thus asks the weight-bearing spirit. That I may take 
it upon me and become well pleased with my strength. 
Is it not this: lowering oneself, in order to hurt one’s haughtiness? Letting one’s 
folly shine forth, in order to mock one’s wisdom? 
Or is it this: separating from our cause when it celebrates victory? Climbing high 
mountains in order to tempt the tempter? 
Or is it this: feeding on the acorns and grass of understanding and for the sake of 
truth suffering hunger of the soul? 
Or is it this: being sick and sending the comforters home, and making friends with 
deaf people who never hear what it is you want? 
Or is it this: stepping into filthy water, as long as they are the waters of truth, and 
not repelling cold frogs or hot toads? 
Or is it this: loving those who despise us, and offering the spectre our hand when 
it wants to frighten us? 
All these heaviest things the weight-bearing spirit takes upon itself: like the camel 
that presses on well laden into the desert, thus does the spirit press on into its desert.  
But in the loneliest desert the second transformation occurs: the spirit here be-
comes a lion; it will seize freedom for itself and become lord in its own desert. 
It’s ultimate lord it seeks out here: his enemy it will become and enemy of his ulti-
mate god; it will wrestle for victory with the greatest dragon. 
What is the great dragon that the spirit no longer likes to call Lord and God? ‘Thou 
shalt’ is the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion says “I will.”  
‘Thou shalt’ lies in its way, sparkling with god, a scaly beat, and on every scale there glis-
tens, golden, ‘Thou Shalt!’ 
Values thousands of years old glisten on these scales, and thus speaks the mightiest 
of all dragons: ‘All value in things—that glistens on me.’ 
‘All value has already been created, and all created value—that is me. Verily, there 
shall be no more “I will”!’ Thus speaks the dragon. 
My brothers, why is the lion needed in the spirit? Why does the beast of burden, 
which is renounces and is reverent, not suffice? 
To create new values—that even the lion cannot yet do: but to create for itself free-
dom for new creation—that is within the power of the lion. 
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To create freedom for oneself and a sacred Nay even to duty: for that, my brothers, 
the lion is needed. 
To seize the right to new values—that is the most terrible seizure for a weight-bear-
ing and reverent spirit. Verily, a predation it is to such a spirit and a matter for a predatory 
beast. 
Once it loved, as most sacred for it, ‘Thou shalt’: now it must find delusion and 
caprice even in the most sacred, that it might seize its freedom from its love: for this pre-
dation the lion is needed. 
But say, my brothers, what can the child yet do that even the lion could not do? 
Why must the predatory lion yet become a child? 
Innocence the child is and forgetting, a beginning anew, a play, a self-propelling 
wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yea-saying. 
Yes, for the play of creating, my brothers, a sacred Yea-saying is needed: the spirit 
now wills its own will, the one who had lost the world attain its own world. 
Three transformations of spirit have I named for you: how the spirit became a 
camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.— 
 
Thus spoke Zarathustra. And at that time he was staying in the town that is called: The 
Motley Cow. 
 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: (Nietzsche, 23,24) 
 
 
Before analyzing this speech, I would like to present some notes that will help the 
reader go forward. First, in the first part of this paper, the sovereign individual was de-
scribed as the end product of will unification. The speech (above) presents another ideal 
called “the child.”  The child is like the sovereign individual in that the child is “a begin-
ning anew… a self-propelling wheel, a first movement.” However, the child is also a “sa-
cred yea-saying” spirit that affirms its life. This may mean that the child and the sovereign 
individual are not the same ideal because the sovereign individual seems to lack the fea-
ture of life affirmation. The sovereign individual ideal only contains freedom and respon-
sibility.  However, Nietzsche claims that the life instinct is will to power, and will to power 
is expressed in the sovereign individual by means of will unification, the affirmation (the 
life instinct) of one’s life must be expressed through this will unification (GM 2,18 [p.87]).  
It is also the case that the child must affirm its life and so the child may use the same 
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process of will unification. This means that the sovereign individual and the child have 
the same goal and even if they may be separate ideals, the two can be equated if we wish 
to understand the process of will unification.     
Second, I would like to remind the reader of some of the main feature in Katsa-
fanas’s psychology.  First, for the purposes of this paper, we can exchange the terms “val-
ues,” “drives,” and “will” because each specific value is intimately connected to a specific, 
desire, and perspective, and all of these are the necessary constituent parts of a single 
drive. Second, once psychological drives have been identified with necessary constitutive 
components of will and value, the following claim can be made: ranking and ordering 
one’s values, ranking and ordering one’s drives, and ranking and ordering one’s disparate 
fragments of will are all equated in this process.   
Third, Using Katsafanas’s psychology, I assume that the camel and the lion are two 
different drives within the human psyche. I will also assume Nietzsche’s “spirit” (see 2.2) 
to be the dominating drive at any specific moment. So the “spirit” of the camel is instituted 
within the individual when the set of drives known as the camel are the ruling power of 
the human psyche. And, the “spirit” of the lion is instituted within the individual when 
the set of drives known as the lion are the ruling power of the human psyche.  
Last, this final section’s total objective and thesis is to identify a process that Nie-
tzsche would equate with the process of an individual’s attempt to unify his will. The ar-
gument will proceed in the following manner. First, I quickly present an interpretation of 
the speech, and then I explain specific conflicts a reader may have with this first interpre-
tation. Second, I suggest a second interpretation that reads the speech in a “functional” 
manner such that each spirit serves a “functional” relation to the others. The functions 
are all different, but each function will make sense as we advance through the material. 
 
 
27 
 
In my third and final argument: I will argue that the unified will can only be formed from 
the seemingly opposite camel and lion spirits, and once this occurs, Nietzsche’s ideal of 
the sovereign individual is instantiated within the person, and that person is a free-willed, 
responsible moral agent.   
 
 
3.1 First Interpretation 
 
The first spiritual form that Nietzsche speaks about is the camel. Nietzsche de-
scribes the camel as a tame creature of reverence. It is a “weight-bearing spirit” that is 
“pleased” to take on the burdens that it has been given. This person happily takes on its 
moral burden of “renouncing” because he possesses an attitude of reverence toward what 
he believes to be moral truth. This attitude of reverence manifests itself in the “love” (TSZ 
1:1 [24]) the camel has for the truth. The camel is willing to suffer “for the sake of truth,” 
and it is willing to step into “filthy waters” in order to find and follow moral truth. These 
characteristics of reverence and truth seeking allow the spirit to proceed alone into the 
desert where it will then transform into the lion (TSZ 1;1 [23]).      
 The lion is the second form in the hierarchy presented in “On the Three Transfor-
mations.” The lion “seizes freedom for itself and becomes lord in its own desert” (TSZ 1;1 
[23]). This desert is the world of values and beliefs, and in this desert the lion does battle 
with the dragon. The dragon is the law of “thou shall,” and the dragon claims that “all 
value has already been created.” Notice this is a moral realist claim much like Kant’s cat-
egorical imperative. Since the lion refuses the laws of “thou shall,” the lion also rejects 
Kantian moral realism when it says, “I will.” However, this spirit is not one of creation but 
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of critique. It critiques and it denies moral realism. This will can only be anti-moral real-
ism. It says “Nay” to all Kant’s “duties,” and in this denial it creates the “freedom for new 
creation.”  The lion “seizes its freedom from (the camel’s) love.” And in the process, the 
lions destroys the reverence that the camel possessed for moral truth in the form of Kant’s 
moral realism. However, the lion possesses no value of its own.  It is a valueless spirit, and 
so it is also a spirit of nihilism (TSZ 1;1 [24]). 
Finally, the man must become a “child.” The child is a “self-propelling wheel, a first 
movement, a sacred Yea-saying.”  The first two characteristics describe the child’s unified 
will.  It is free and its own cause for its actions.  It is an active will and not a reactive will.  
The last characteristic describes the child’s reverence, and thus affirmation of its own 
value system. This “spirit now wills its own will” (TSZ 1;1 [24]). Yet once again, we must 
ask, “How can a responsible and playful spirit arise out of a nihilistic tendency.   
     
3.2 The Problems of Transformation  
When the “spirit” is interpreted as the psychological drive/will that is likely to 
dominate at some give time,7 certain problems may arise during attempts to explain the 
relationships between these three forms. Prima facie, if we take the perspective of each 
animal spirit, all of these forms are both isolated from each other and antagonistic to-
wards each other in that they do not seem to be compatible or related by any measures. 
Proof of isolation consists in the fact that the camel is reverent, but the lion is valueless. 
The child laughs, while the lion destroys. And the camel is reverent towards objective 
moral values, but the child follows his own internal set of subjective values. Thus there 
                                                          
7 See section 2.2  
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are no seemingly consistent, overlapping characteristics that these spirits share. Further-
more, the move from camel to lion to child is one of reverence to destruction/nihilism and 
back to reverence, and Nietzsche offers no explanation of how each spirit form may be 
constructed or converted to another within this process. Thus these spirits are not merely 
incompatible; they are antagonistic towards each other. Putting both of these concerns 
together, Nietzsche specifically does not explain how a spirit that has reverence for rule 
and law can transform into a nihilistic, anti-cultural spirit, and then back into an inno-
cent, reverential spirit.   
The next few paragraphs will further motivate these problems between the camel, 
lion, and child spirits. The camel is prima facie, the common man of a culture, but Nie-
tzsche does not explicitly make this claim.  In fact, he is already speaking about an ex-
tremely specific type of psyche.  Notice how the camel has reverence for the moral rules 
that are placed upon its back.  This reverence is important, but Nietzsche is making a 
more specific claim than first recognized because he claims that there is love in the rever-
ence, thus love and reverence have a specific relationship for Nietzsche.  Starting with this 
relationship between love and reverence, the camel can be distinguished from other ani-
mals in the “herd,” but there are even distinctions between the other “herd” types. 
One example concerns the strength of sustaining a dominating will. This charac-
teristic varies in degree depending on the particular type of “herd” animal.  Nietzsche  
claims in the Genealogy of Morals that the ascetic priests are masters of themselves in a 
way that the common man is not.  This allows them to rule over the common people.  Once 
we realize that mastery over one’s will comes in degrees, other non-explicit distinctions 
can be made that separate the herd from the camel.  (GM 3,15)  For instance, not all people 
follow the rules and laws of their society because they have a positive attitude of reverence 
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towards these rules and laws.  There is a first set of people who hold a neutral attitude 
towards these laws and rules. Thus, other motivations compel them to follow their cul-
ture.  First, they may follow rules and laws out of habit.  Second, they may desire to be 
inconspicuous.  Or third, they may follow rules and laws for utility reasons.  And there is 
yet another set of people who hold an attitude of rebellion against these laws but follow 
the laws for the same reasons as the first group or have the extended motivation of fearing 
the punishment that will be inflicted upon them.  Thus, the attitude of reverence is ex-
tremely specific and not held by all tamed animals.   
This first interpretation of the speech portrays the camel spirit as an individual that 
is more refined than most of the herd.  It is a creature of reverence who follows morals 
truth no matter what the consequences. This is a Kantian Ideal (see 2.3). If we assume the 
sovereign individual and the child spirit are equated, we can return to Essay 2.2 of the 
Geneaology for this implicit, if not explicit claim. Nietzsche states with parantheses, “for 
autonomous and moral are mutually exclusive.”  This parenthetical remark is not an at-
tack against morality in general.  It is an attack against Kant’s account of morality and 
Kant’s ideal of the autonomous human being.  Kant believes that the moral agent is the 
autonomous agent in that one’s autonomy depends on how well one instantiates moral 
truths in one’s actions. This relates back to the camel because the Kantian idea of morality 
involves a tool that he calls a categorical imperative. This tool is an extension of man’s 
rational function which presumably allows man to gain epistemic access to morally ob-
jective facts external to man’s own subjective thoughts, desires, and emotions. Thus, Nie-
tzsche believes the camel is an ideal Kantian agent who follows the moral law not because 
of fear or practicality, but because the moral law is the moral truth. 
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Now that the camel has been categorically distinguished from all the other tamed 
animals, the camel’s conflict with the lion is more profound.  The camel spirit is in itself a 
masterful spirit in that it commands itself, it feels power and affirms itself by following 
moral law. However, the camel is more than a creature that follow the rules and laws 
consistently. The camel is a creature who does this not with a neutral or negative attitude, 
but with a positive attitude of reverence. In Kantian terms, the camel is someone who 
embraces moral truth and therefore, does the right thing for the right reasons. And, if a 
person embraces this type of self-constitution scheme, it is an even more difficult task to 
understand why the camel’s strong loving reverence might take the further antithetical 
step into nihilism. From all this, the reader may conclude the following: once this extreme 
difference between the camel and other herd animal is distinguished, the additional claim 
that the camel’s reverence is antithetical to the lions’ nihilism is almost severe because 
the reader may ask, “What is wrong with the form of the camel’s spirit? What reason 
would it need to transform into something else?” 
The problem of the lion’s transition to the child is more straightforward than the 
camel. It is not a problem of motivation, but a problem of ability.  The lion’s will is strong, 
and its will is supposedly stronger than the camel’s since it is above the camel in the hier-
archal structure of spirits.  And yet, the lion is both powerful and impotent at the same 
time. This is not an outright contradiction, but it does not make sense either. If the lion is 
powerful enough to separate itself from the system of values that the camel followed, 
shouldn’t the lion also have the ability to create a new set of values for itself?   
Without the ability to create new values, the lion is nothing but a spirit of destruc-
tion. This produces further questions: why should the lion be viewed to be any stronger 
than the camel when the lion is a creature that exists in a state of nihilism (no values)?  
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And without values, shouldn’t the lion slip into chaos and death, for if nothing has value, 
how does the lion continue to function or order its life in any systematic manner that 
affirms said life?  
And last, from this state of nihilism, the strenuous task of recreating reverence ap-
pears to be an impossibility because the ideal of moral realism has been destroyed. So the 
reader may also want to ask: what power does a nihilist spirit of destruction have to be-
come a spiritual form that is fully autonomous, self-willing, and creator of its own values 
(like a child)? Or to ask another way, how does the impotent, valueless lion suddenly re-
generate itself and shift into a form that is a first cause, responsible and free in a moral 
sense?  
 
Interpretation 2 
3.3 The Camel Spirit: Reverence/Affirmation Function 
These problems can be solved if we reconcile the differences between the spirits.  
We know that the spirits appear in a specific order, and this order may be necessary to 
Nietzsche. If an argument can be made that each spirit performs a necessary function and 
contains a necessary feature that allows the preceding or following spirit to also do its 
function, then the tensions between the spirits can be relieved. Thus, locating that func-
tion is a promising effort to understanding the correct relations between the spirits and 
relieving the tensions that exists between said spirits. I will explain the function of the 
camel spirit in two ways. First I will explain the camel’s features as they relate to Kantian 
moral law. Second, I will explain why the camel, as a Kantian ideal, leads to nihilism. 
  Specifically, the camel spirit needs Kant’s objective moral law in order to grow 
and prepare for the lion transformation. Nietzsche believes that the camel “lowers itself” 
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in order to “hurt its haughtiness.” This means that the camel takes on the attitude of one 
who “obeys.” When the camel “obeys,” the moral law, the camel is obeying the laws of the 
Kant’s categorical imperative. Of course these laws are external to the camel, but they are 
also empowering to the camel because the camel believes these laws to be his own. The 
camel “recognize(es) something outside oneself as one’s own” because its rational will is 
presumably able to assess these external objective moral truths by use of the categorical 
imperative. So, the camel is capable of affirming its life and thus, expresses its will to 
power through this process of recognizing objective moral truths by use of the rational 
will.   
The camel’s attitude towards engaging with these objective moral laws is also spe-
cific. It is an attitude of celebration.  The camel is a strong spirit that happily does what it 
is told. Kant’s categorical imperative says “Thou shall not…” and the camel follows each 
and every law because the camel’s will to power is invigorated by following these laws. 
The camel is strong in will because it follows the laws with a sense of reverence, and it is 
this reverence that distinguishes the camel from the common, standard man.   
We can once again contrast the camel with the common standard man.  Such men 
follow moral laws for a different reason—“they want that nobody should hurt them” “vir-
tue for them is whatever makes one modest and tame.  With that they have made the wolf 
into a dog and the human being itself into the human’s best domestic animal” (TSZ 3:5, 
[147]). This quote describes the characteristic of the “herd” animals who are not camels, 
and it also implicitly describes two of the camel’s Kantian characteristics. First, the camel 
is not afraid to suffer.  This parallels Kant’s ideal moral agent because Kant’s agent does 
not worry about the consequences of his actions. Suffering may be involved in doing the 
right thing. Second, the goal of the camel is neither modesty nor civility.  The goal, much 
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like Kant’s ideal, is self-unification that leads to life affirmation. So we can conclude that 
the camel spirit shares the characteristics of other domesticated animals in that the camel 
follows moral laws. But the standard man celebrates that which he cannot do while the 
camel uses the external objective moral laws as a means to affirm life by sustaining a will 
that seeks to obey with a sense of reverence (GM 1:14 [483]). 
Now that the camel can be fully understand as a Kantian ideal, its problems must 
be recognized.  The features that follow are the clues that Nietzsche has given the reader 
to work with in understanding the camel. First, the camel is a specific drive or set of drives 
whose dominant characteristic is reverence, and reverence contains and is expressed in 
the attitudes of holding sacred, affirming the worth of, nurturing, and obeying. Second, 
the camel wants to take on the weight of something, and that something is the restrictions 
placed on the camel by objective moral law.  
Through these features, the camel seems to be a true life affirming spirit that 
should be able to unify the will. However, this assumption is wrong for the following rea-
son. While describing the camel, I have deliberately made the reader aware of the fact that 
“objective moral laws” exist external to the camel, and it is this fact that is a problem for 
the camel. Nietzsche believes that appealing to external objective moral laws is a denial 
of one’s own life because to affirm something outside of oneself is not the same thing as 
affirming one’s own life. The camel thinks that he is affirming himself when he affirms 
objective moral laws due to his rational capacity. But this is wrong because the camel is 
only affirming one part of himself, his rational capacity. It consciously believes that its 
rational will has accessed moral objective truths and if the camel aligns itself with those 
moral truths, then it will unify its will. However, this all results in the following problem: 
 
 
35 
 
By gaining epistemic access to morally objective facts, the camel also attaches its rever-
ence to an external source.  The camel then identifies this external source of morality as 
its reason for living. Thus, the camel affirms its life in a non-life affirming process.  Nie-
tzsche calls this lack of life affirmation “nihilism.”    
 
 
 
3.4 The Lion Spirit: Doubt Function 
 In order to understand the relation between the camel and the lion we need to first 
know the lion’s function and how that function may be invigorated or helped by the camel 
spirit. The function of the lion is written in Zarathustra’s speech. It has the function of 
“seiz(ing) freedom for itself” and becoming its own “lord.”  The lion  seizes its freedom 
from its “enemy,” its “ultimate god,” also known as the “greatest dragon.” And, “Thou 
shalt” is the name of this lord. “Thou shalt” refers to Kant’s duty and the lion “says Nay 
even to duty.” 
   Putting this into context, the camel spirit obeys that which objective moral truth 
commands and the natural conclusion to this relationship is nihilism. Kant’s duties and 
laws of “thou shalt” are the objective moral truths that hold power like a lord over the 
camel, and thus lead the camel into nihilism. In order to save itself from life denial, the 
camel must instantiate the lion so that it may seize back its right to rule over itself and 
affirm its own life.   
So from this perspective, the lion is not a means to nihilism.  The lion is instead, 
the savior who recognizes the forthcoming nihilism of the camel, and in order to save the 
individual from falling into life denial, the lion to seizes command from that which is ex-
ternal. The lion says, “No” to the demands, obligations, and duties that Kant’s moral law 
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places upon the back of the camel spirit. The lion says “No” to Kant’s categorical impera-
tive because it is the lion’s function to save the camel from life denial. The lion does this 
by celebrating and affirming the only thing it really can, its own existence. In order to do 
this is must tell all external sources, including society, “I no longer have one consciousness 
with you” (TSZ 1:17, [54]).   
 I have explained what the lion does for the camel, but the relationship is reciprocal 
and the camel also helps the lion. Nietzsche recognizes a deeply ingrained instinct in hu-
mans. We are social creatures by nature, and we crave the companionship of other people. 
We crave their support.  We crave their intimacy.  We crave their touch and their recog-
nition. However, this social instinct is an external source of life affirmation, and so it must 
also be cut away. Nietzsche recognizes this deep ingrained instinct not just for its exist-
ence, but for its strength. Thus the lion must use the strength of will that the camel has 
developed, the will and ability to suffer and sit alone with one’s burdens. In this way, the 
lion uses the camel’s strength to cut the individual’s ties with all external sources of life 
affirmation, including all other people.   
The lion is the result of the camel’s realization of its own strength in reverence. The 
camel has spent time practicing its duties and obligations without appeal to any type of 
consequences. It does what is good because “doing the good” is the moral truth that it  
abides by. Hence, the camel rejects both consequences and all appeals to human pleasure 
as being good.  This requires much strength however, the lion knows that the object of 
reverence can no longer be that which is external. The new object of reverence must be 
oneself. The lion is the understanding that a person knows, by way of the camel’s prac-
tices, that he has the ability to live completely free of others. Once this realization is made, 
the camel does the heavy lifting for the severe, lion.  The lion’s strength is derivative of 
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the camel’s ability to obey the lion as the lion battles with one of the wills strongest in-
stincts. That instinct is the desire to be part of something external to itself. Such external-
ities include, both society and objective moral laws.    
 The lion drive uses the strength of the camel drive in order to make its break from 
the external. However, I can also ask, “What capacities does the lion drive contain in it-
self?” “What motivates the lion to break away?”  The answer is two-fold: doubt and cour-
age.  “Delusion and caprice” refer to the doubt that must be placed on every value from 
an external source, and critique with severity is a must. Nietzsche states, “To understand: 
that is the pleasure of the lion willed” (TSZ 3,16 [p.179]). For Nietzsche, understanding 
requires knowledge and certain tendencies. “Every courageous thinker will recognize this 
in himself…he has hardened and sharpened his eye for himself long enough and that he 
is used to severe discipline as well as severe words” (BGE, 230 [p.161]).  This courageous 
severity in the lion’s intellectual doubting process parallels the severity of the camel’s rev-
erence.    
 
3.5 The Child Spirit: Ranking and Ordering Function 
The processes of camel and lion seem to naturally follow one another when we re-
alize that both the lion is the camel’s savior, and the camel is a means to the lion’s objec-
tive. The next step is to understand the child’s function and relate that function back to 
both the lion and the camel. Most of Nietzsche’s imagery concerning the child relates to 
affirmation, autonomy, and responsibility. This “child is described as “a beginning anew, 
a play, a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred yea-saying.” However, the child 
is also “innocent” and “forgetting.”   
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The first part of this imagery is much like the sovereign individual, however “inno-
cent” and “forgetting” need to be explained and somehow related to the other concepts. 
In order to provide this explanation I will take a step back and talk about Nietzsche’s con-
cepts of creation, destruction and transformation. Once these concepts are explained I 
will relate them back to Nietzsche’s imagery and continue the explanation of the child 
spirit.   
 
3.5 (a) Transformations  
(1) “Change of values—that means change of creators. Whoever must be a creator always 
annihilates” (TSZ 1:15, [52]) 
 
(2) “whoever must be a creator in good and evil: verily, he must first be an annihilator and 
shatter values.”  (TSZ 2:12, [100]) 
 
(3) “The one who breaks their tablet of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker:--yet that is 
the creator” (TSZ 1:9, [21]) 
 
Destruction, creation, and transformation are specific relations for Nietzsche.  I 
will start with transformation. First, there are two ways an object may transform its qual-
ities in relation to time. It may change these properties instantaneously or incrementally. 
An example of instantaneous change would consist in pouring certain chemical solutions 
together such that they produce a precipitate instantly. As soon as the two solutions in-
teract, the empirical qualities change.  An example of incremental change consists in 
watching a tadpole change into a frog or watching a caterpillar change into a butterfly.  
There is also a second question to be asked about transformation.  What does it 
mean when we say something has transformed?  This change may mean (a) adopting 
some new essential features, (b) loss of some essential features, (c) adoption and loss of 
some essential features, (d) loss of all previous essential features and adoption of all new 
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essential features, or (e) manipulation of essential features.   Of course what we call es-
sential here is relative to context so I will stay at the levels of appearance for most of this 
argument.      
 Roughly, examples of (a,b,c) can be found in a caterpillar’s appearance as it 
changes into a butterfly.  Wings are grown and color is added and the caterpillar seems to 
be a new insect. Hair is lost.  And depending on the type of caterpillar (a), (b) or (c) hap-
pens at the appearance level.  However at the DNA level, the caterpillar and the butterfly 
are the same.  One may wish to explain the caterpillar’s transformation in terms of (d) but 
this is incorrect because the DNA of the caterpillar and the butterfly are the same.  One 
cannot change the DNA of the caterpillar without creating something new. (d) may be 
called magic because it’s an impossibility in the everyday world of human existence. The 
DNA stays the same, but some parts of the DNA are expressed at certain times whereas 
other parts of the DNA are expressed at other times.  An example of (e) is in the aqueous 
solutions from the time relation. The two solutions were combined and formed a precip-
itate. However, all elemental components remain the same even though the appearance 
of the elements change as they recombine with other elements in the solutions.   
 The question now is which type of these types of transformations does Nietzsche 
appeal? The answer lies in Nietzsche’s story about internalizing the instincts. The instinc-
tual drives wish to present themselves in an external manner, but they are forced back 
into man creating the depth and breadth of man’s inner world. But Nietzsche admits that 
nothing is essentially changed about the drives, only their appearance. Just as ice become 
water, the material-instinctual drives becomes mental drives. And as Nietzsche claims “all 
instincts that do not discharge themselves outward turn inward—this is what I call the 
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internalization of man” (GM 2:16, [520]) Thus Nietzsche’s change in spirit is truly a trans-
formation of type (e) because it is a manipulation of essential elements.  There is only a 
solution of various elements that combine, separate, and recombine.  However, as these 
elements recombine with each other, the outward actions and behaviors can change.  So 
at the lower level there is only manipulation of elements whereas at the upper level, there 
are extreme changes.   
  
3.5 (b) Creation and Destruction 
A second question of transformation involves the relationship between creation 
and destruction. There are three ways creation and destruction happen. I will review these 
three ways in terms of building/creating a hospital. (1), One may first build/create a new 
hospital from new resources and then destroy/bulldoze the old hospital. (2), One may 
first destroy/bulldoze the old hospital and then build a new hospital using new resources 
or some combination of the old and new resources. And third, one may take apart the old 
hospital piece by piece while simultaneously using those pieces to build a new. Notice that 
in the first two examples, new resources are introduced and there are elements of before 
and after, but in the last example, only the existing resources are required and the creation 
destruction happen simultaneously.    
Nietzsche’s metaphysics concerning the internalization of desires only correspond 
to the third option. The first two options of creation need new resources and these re-
sources are not available to the spirit. It must work with the drives it has been given. How-
ever, a remark can be made. Returning to the butterfly/caterpillar example, certain ex-
pressions of DNA may happen at certain times meaning there are resources in storage 
that have not been used. In the same way a hospital may have resources in its basement 
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that are not used in the current hospital but may be used in the creating the new hospital. 
And, so a spirit may also have unused drives that it incorporates as it becomes stronger.   
 
3.5 (c) Back to the Child 
Understanding the child in relation to these concepts of creation, destruction, and 
transformation helps explain the functions of “forgetting” and “innocence.” It also helps 
to relate “forgetting” and “innocence” to the other features: “a beginning anew, a play, a 
self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred yea-saying.” 
From the previous sections, I assume that the child is the culmination of the will 
unification process, thus the child is the individual who contains a unified will, and for 
Nietzsche, a unified will is a will that has a permanently sustained dominant drive that 
rules over all the other drives.  I also assume that in a free will, the drives that are lower 
can be brought forth when they are needed by the dominant drives thus there is various 
rearrangements of these lower drives depending on how the lower can serve the higher.  
These rearrangements are transformations of creation and destructions where the per-
manent reigning spirit both creates and destroys its underlying structure.  This was pre-
viously referred to as “appropriation.”  
So when the child is “forgetting” it is not forgetting in the sense of forgetting a 
memory. It is forgetting in the sense that it can rearrange the multiple components of its 
will. We can understand this if we use the opposition of words, forgetting and remember-
ing. One may remember some thought, idea, etc. But one may also re-member an object, 
meaning to put it back together.  Thus when the child “forgets,” the child allows a current 
structure of drives/will to fall apart, and then it re-members the drives/will in a different 
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structure depending on the circumstance. And thus, like creation and destruction, forget-
ting and remembering happen simultaneously as the non-dominant drives are “appropri-
ated” in new ways.8  
The child’s “innocence” can also be related to this structuring. This restructuring 
is always a new start, a new affirmation, thus when the wills are rearranged the child is 
reborn. And so there is a “beginning anew” and a “first movement.” This affirmation 
works with the analogy of the child at “play” because when a child plays with a toy at some 
particular moment in time, that toy is everything to the child. The child affirms the value 
of the toy, and that affirmation is the “sacred yea-saying” of the child. That toy is the 
child’s most valuable possession. And then, there will be another moment where there is 
a new toy, a new situation and the child forgets the past. There is another “forgetting,” 
another restructuring and another first movement.  
Thus the function of the child is to “rank and order” values, and I argue that the 
child “ranks and orders” the existing values, thus remolding the individual into something 
new. This process of “ranking and ordering” one’s values is the process of creating, de-
stroying, and transforming simultaneously while using the same materials, adding noth-
ing new, nor taking anything away.  Even more, since the will and “self” have been 
equated, this process of “ranking and ordering” of values is equivalent to molding, shap-
ing, and constructing the self.   
 
 
 
                                                          
8 This was suggested by Scott Cowan.   
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3.5 (d) Woman and Man: Camel and Lion 
But how does the child accomplish this “ranking and ordering,” and how does the 
child use the other two spirits to accomplish its goal?  We must remember that the camel 
and lion drives are not unifying spirits alone. They are sets of drives that command for a 
certain amount of time, affirming life in particular ways, but also destined for failure if 
left in their dominant position.  Hence, the camel and lion spirits are not permanent while 
the child must be permanent.   
I believe that the child is not a new spirit or drive.  The child is the outcome of both 
the camel and lion drives sharing this dominant position. So, in an aristocratic fashion, 
these two drives share leadership over all the other drives and this unification of leader-
ship between the two drives also unifies the individual’s will as a whole.  The camel and 
lion drives act as internal, self-valuing commanders, and all other drives obey these mas-
ters.  Thus the child spirit uses the lion to say “nay to duty” and “seizes the right to new 
values.”  And at the same time, the child uses the obeying camel to affirm these new val-
ues.  Nietzsche does not explicitly claim that the camel and lion must combine under the 
child spirit, but the child is a contradiction in that it both creates and destroys. Separately, 
the lion and the camel contradict each other also much in the same way.  The camel is a 
drive of reverence (creation) while the lion is a drive of doubt (destruction). But Nietzsche 
provides a reconciling metaphor using men and women.  This metaphor may point at the 
final relationship between these two drives.      
First, Nietzsche implicitly claims that the camel drive is a feminine drive.  He says, 
“Where there is great love of oneself, it is the true sign of pregnancy.” (TSZ 3:3 [139])  He 
also refers to the “maternal instinct, the secret love of that which is growing in him” This 
maternal instinct that Nietzsche refers to is not creation but love for something, and also 
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the desire to care and nurture something. Pregnancy is the promise of creation and the 
maternal instinct is that which nurtures and provides care. Though the analogy has its 
flaws, the instincts to nurture and provide care are much like the reverence of the camel.  
We can claim that when an individual has reverence for something, that individual takes 
care of the revered object.  So the camel can be represented as the spirit of the nurturer.  
Nietzsche names this spirit “woman.”    
Second, Nietzsche implicitly claims that the lion drive is a masculine drive. I have 
also argued that the lion represents doubt, and doubt is the polar opposite of reverence.  
The camel has reverence for society and therefore, the camel obeys without question.   The 
lion’s most basic feature is to question whether that reverence is due.  The lion doubts,  
and with this doubt the lion destroys reverence for society.  The violence of the lion can 
be quoted if we associate the lion with the male.  Nietzsche claims “Thus will I have man 
and woman: the one adept in war, the other adept in birth, but both adept in dancing with 
heads and legs.”  (TSZ 3:23, [183])   
Third, both the lion and the camel are impotent alone.  Neither of them is a “crea-
tor” of values. The lion can say “No,” but it cannot create value. The camel can revere but 
it cannot give birth value.  Thus neither the lion nor the camel can create values alone. 
Relating this back to the man and woman, only the woman’s body is capable of giving 
birth, but the woman cannot give birth until she is joined with the man. They must be-
come one before the child can be created. Thus the contradiction of man and woman, 
birth and war, reverence and doubt, must be united to produce a laughing child. And once 
joined, the lion can protect and say “NO” while the camel claims and reveres new values.   
Thus they work together as a unit in self-creation.     
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Nietzsche’s speech “On Children and Marriage” also gives reason to accept this in-
terpretation that the camel and lion become the aristocratic dominating drives and this 
shared dominance gives birth to the “child” spirit.  He writes: 
 
You are young and wish for a child and marriage.  But I ask you now: are you a human being with the right 
to wish for a child?”—Not only onward shall you propagate yourself, but upward!  May the garden of mar-
riage help you to do so! A higher body shall you create, a first movement, a self-propelling wheel-a creator 
shall you create. Marriage: thus I call the the will of two to create the one that is more that those who created 
it. Reverence for each other I call marriage, as for the willers of such a will. 
   
He restates this relationship later in Zarathustra when he says, “To propogate 
yourselves not only onward, but upward—to that end, O my brother, may the garden of 
marriage help you” (TSZ 3,24 [184]). Both of these quotes imply a relationship of two 
things creating one and with that creation, the spirit rises in terms of its spirituality. 
Hence, the camel and lion rise to become the child.  And as they rise towards will unifica-
tion, autonomy, and responsibility, certain features can be claimed that identify the child. 
Nietzsche claims “All good things laugh—whoever is approaching his goal dance—Lift up 
you hearts, my bothers, high! Higher! And do not forget your legs either!  Lift up you legs 
too, you fine dancers and better still: even stand on your heads” (TSZ 4,17  [257]) 
This marriage relation between the spirits is also strengthened by Nietzsche’s met-
aphors of “ripe fruit” and “miscarriage.”  The child is the fruit of the man and woman but 
it the process is not completed, the individual becomes a miscarriage because the ideal 
has not been achieved.  Those who are self-creators are often referred to by this metaphor 
of pregnancy. Nietzsche writes, “You creators, you superior humans! One is pregnant only 
for one’s own child” and “In your selfishness, you creators, is the prudence and providence 
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of those who are pregnant! That which no one has ever laid eyes on, the fruit:  that is what 
your entire love shelters and protects and nourishes” (TSZ 4,11 [254]).   
There may still be a question of how this unification happens in a metaphysical 
sense.  There must be some type of feature or relationship between the two that acts as a 
unifier. I suggest that Nietzsche uses a Hegelian style of argument for this unifying fea-
ture. This can be confirmed if we notice that Nietzsche constantly speaks of the spirit “ris-
ing” in many of the quotes that I used to connect the camel and the lion in the previous 
paragraphs.  This “rising” of spirit is the same language Hegel uses when he speaks of 
“new” knowledge.  Coarsely,9 Hegel believes that new knowledge is gained in the follow-
ing manner.  There is a thesis and antithesis, and these two are seemingly opposite, but 
then we find a way to synthesize these two opposites into a unified whole. In this way, old 
knowledge concerning a thesis and an antithesis “rises” into a new type of synthesized 
knowledge. This process of Hegelian knowledge is a metaphor for the metaphysical pro-
cess that happens with the camel and the lion. The camel and lion are not only two distinct 
components.  They are opposites in the same way thesis and antithesis are opposites.  
However, they must share one specific dominant spot of existence. They “rise” into this 
dominant spot in the psyche, and it is there that they seize command. Neither alone, can 
unify the will but when they assume this aristocratic rule over the other drives, they not 
only bring opposites into synthesis, they bring a multitude of drives into synthesis.  And 
it is this feature of shared dominance that acts as not only their own unification but as the 
unification of the entire will.  
                                                          
9 As a Non-Hegelian scholar… 
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In conclusion, if my interpretation is accepted, the child spirit is the interplay be-
tween these two dominating spirits: camel and child. The child both commands reverence 
to itself and its own values, and it ranks and orders its drives.  In this fashion Nietzsche’s 
project of responsibility and what it means to self-create goes beyond Kant’s.  Kant’s con-
ception of autonomy begins and ends with morality, yet the extent of the human condition 
goes past Kant’s ethical concerns.  There is much that Kant leaves out when he speaks 
about the will and its freedom, especially about one’s own goals and desires. Hence Nie-
tzsche uses the camel to show how Kant’s conception of morality leads to nihilism or life 
denial.  He uses the lion spirit to critique these external systems of affirmation and then 
cut oneself off from them. And last he uses the child spirit as a mean of establishing the 
features of a fully functional autonomous and responsible individual.  For this reason, 
Nietzsche goes beyond Kant. And so if you thought that it was hard to be free, responsible 
and moral according to Kant’s standards, it is might as well be impossible to be free, re-
sponsible and moral according to Nietzsche.  However, that does not mean that we should 
not strive for this ideal, to be sovereign individuals, self-creating children at play.   
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